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We must accept finite disappointment, but we must never lose infinite 
hope.
1
 
– Martin Luther King, Jr. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On July 28, 1868, Secretary of State William Seward issued the 
proclamation recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment had been 
ratified.
2
  From that day on, the Amendment fundamentally reconstituted 
our union (by becoming a part of our fundamental governing 
document).
3
 
 
 Associate Dean and McDowell Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law.  I would 
like to thank Richard Aynes, Wilson Huhn, and Sarah Cravens for their comments and assistance on 
earlier drafts.  Despite their best efforts, if any historical or other errors appear, they are solely my 
responsibility. 
 1. See JOHN COOK, THE BOOK OF POSITIVE QUOTATIONS 44 (Steve Deger & Leslie Ann 
Gibson eds., 2d ed. 2003). 
 2. William H. Seward, United States Secretary of State, Proclamation, 15 Stat. 708 (1868). 
 3. In contrast with our history of having had to ―amend‖ the Articles of Confederation by 
adopting an entirely new document, our Constitution permits itself to be amended even as 
significantly as the changes wrought in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and 
still remain as the constitutive document of the country.  See Joseph Blocher, Amending the 
Exceptions Clause, 92 MINN. L. REV. 971, 990-91 (2008). 
In a very real sense, the need for amendment is what gave birth to the Constitution.  In 
addition to their notorious substantive weaknesses - such as the lack of a federal taxing 
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This symposium celebrates the 140th anniversary of ratification.
4
  
The anniversary provides us with a fruitful occasion to reflect upon the 
meaning of the Amendment to its Framers in Congress and as it was 
initially interpreted by the United States Supreme Court and the public, 
and to examine the lasting impacts of both conceptions.  We are grateful 
to Richard Aynes
5
 for organizing this symposium.  His work in the area 
of legal history, explicating the framers‘ intent for the Fourteenth 
Amendment and dismantling the early Supreme Court interpretations, 
has been influential in the field.
6
  He has assembled for us a truly 
impressive group of scholars and commentators to engage in this deeper 
 
power - the Articles of Confederation were also structurally brittle and inflexible.  They 
could be amended only by unanimous consent of all the states, making reform all but 
impossible.  David Kyvig, perhaps the leading scholar of Article V and the history of 
constitutional amendment, writes, ―[t]he requirement of unanimous state agreement to 
congressionally initiated proposals to amend the Articles of Confederation was, from the 
outset, the defining characteristic of the first government of the United States.‖  The 
framers were thus forced to ―amend‖ an unamendable document.  As Kyvig puts it, ―It is 
reasonable to argue, in fact, that the 1787 Constitution was both the first and the greatest 
act of U.S. constitutional amendment.‖ 
Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: 
AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, at 37 (1996); DAVID E. KYVIG, ARRANGING FOR 
AMENDMENT: UNINTENDED OUTCOMES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, in UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 9, 18 (David E. Kyvig ed., 2000)). 
 4. It is not usual to celebrate something that occurred 140, rather than, say, 150 years earlier.  
But in addition to the appeal of celebrating an anniversary whose number includes the number 14, a  
second – perhaps more whimsical – reason might be offered.  One hundred forty is the product of 14 
and 10.  One of the most direct effects of the Fourteenth Amendment was on the meaning of the 
10th Amendment: ―The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.‖  U.S. CONST. 
amend. X.  Unquestionably, the Fourteenth Amendment delegated powers to the United States in 
every one of its five sections, and prohibited the states resoundingly from many actions.  From 
Section One‘s ―No state shall make or enforce any law . . .‖, to Section Two‘s direct reduction in 
apportioned representation to any state denying a male citizen of age the right to vote in a federal or 
state election, to Section Three‘s disqualification from federal or state office of those who betrayed 
their previous oaths of office by engaging in insurrection against the United States, to Section 
Four‘s prohibition of a state assuming or paying any debt incurred in aid of insurrection, to Section 
Five‘s grant of power to enforce these provisions, the Fourteenth Amendment leaves no doubt that 
the powers reserved to the states in the 10th Amendment had been radically altered.  U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV. 
 5. Professor Aynes holds the Sieberling Chair in Constitutional Law, in the Constitutional 
Law Center at the University of Akron, one of four centers created by Congress in celebration of the 
Bicentennial of the Constitution.  See 20 U.S.C.A. § 4516 (West 2009). 
 6. See, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627 (1994) 
[hereinafter Aynes, Justice Miller]; Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L. J. 57 (1993) [hereinafter Aynes, John Bingham]. 
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exploration of one of our most cherished and frequently used 
constitutional provisions – the Fourteenth Amendment.
7
 
The Fourteenth Amendment embodies hope.  One of the Civil 
War/Reconstruction Amendments, it grew out of one of the most 
profound and nation-changing ―Constitutional Moments‖8 in our history, 
the Civil War, and its aftermath.  Of the three, the Fourteenth has the 
widest scope, and hence is one of the most frequently invoked sources of 
protection for liberties.
9
  As noted by counsel in Slaughter-House Cases: 
 
 7.  Consistent with the charge from Congress, when it created the University of Akron 
School of Law‘s Constitutional Law Center in commemoration of the bicentennial of the 
Constitution in 1987, this symposium promotes knowledge and understanding about our 
Constitution, and contributes to our abilities to be better lawyers and citizens.  See 20 U.S.C.A. § 
4516 (West 2009). 
 8. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE ACKERMAN, 
WE THE PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).  The constitutional moment in question has been 
identified as ―Congress persuad[ing] the American public to accept as valid the Fourteenth 
Amendment, even though the constitutional processes set out in Article V had allegedly not been 
followed.‖  Steven G. Calabresi, The Libertarian-Lite Constitutional Order and the Rehnquist 
Court:  Reviewing The New Constitutional Order, 93 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1023 (2005) (book review).  
Others identify the moment as the revolution wrought through the Civil War and the Reconstruction 
amendments that sought to unravel the Slave Power and lead to a rebirth of the nation‘s 
foundational principles and structure, enshrining equality and an enhanced view of democracy.  
GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN (2006). 
 9. Cf. Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 229 
(1964) (―The Fourteenth Amendment is probably the largest source of the Court‘s business.‖). 
The Equal Protection Clause has grounded a significant body of jurisprudence that protects equal 
enjoyment of fundamental rights as well as status classifications.  But nothing captures the essence 
of the claims to increased guaranteed liberties under the Amendment as does the ―incorporation‖ 
debate. The current legal question revolves around whether a specific guarantee of the Bill of Rights 
should apply to the states, called ―selective incorporation,‖ and uses the Due Process Clause to 
incorporate those rights.  See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328-329 (1937).  The debate, 
reflected in many of the papers in this symposium, centers around whether or not the Amendment 
was designed to, or should, protect people against state deprivations of all of the liberties guaranteed 
in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights against the federal government, chiefly through the 
intended meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  See Aynes, John Bingham, supra note 6 
(explicating the debate about incorporation and reviewing the chief proponents on each position); 
Robert Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 864 n.8 (1986) (detailing the primary texts in the 
incorporation debate and the positions they took).  Currently, the debate has been revitalized over 
the question of whether or not the Second Amendment right to bear arms, recognized in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 128 U.S. 2783 (2008), applies to the states.  In addition, Justice Thomas argues 
that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment should not apply to the states.  Van Orden v. 
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692-93 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (upholding against an Establishment 
Clause challenge a Ten Commandments monument placed among other monuments intended to 
represent ―strands in the State‘s political and legal history‖ (at p. 678) on Texas State Capitol 
grounds) (―This case would be easy if the Court were willing to abandon the inconsistent guideposts 
it has adopted for addressing Establishment Clause challenges, and return to the original meaning of 
the Clause. I have previously suggested that the Clause's text and history ‗resis[t] incorporation‘ 
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The comprehensiveness of this amendment, the natural and necessary 
breadth of the language, the history of some of the clauses; their 
connection with discussions, contests, and domestic commotions that 
form landmarks in the annals of constitutional government; the 
circumstances under which it became part of the Constitution, 
demonstrate that the weighty import of what it ordains is not to be 
misunderstood.
10
 
It would be hard to overestimate the importance of these 
Amendments;
11
 some have called their adoption the ―second 
founding.‖12 
Among the many reasons to enshrine the Fourteenth Amendment in 
a position of constitutional primacy is the fact that it was designed to 
have, and has had, profound effects upon all three of the structural 
principles undergirding the Constitution: federalism, individual rights, 
 
against the States.  If the Establishment Clause does not restrain the States, then it has no application 
here, where only state action is at issue.‖ (internal citations omitted)(alteration in original)). 
 10. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 54 (1873) (summary of John Campbell‘s argument 
for the plaintiff-in-error).  
As participants in the symposium, especially Michael Ross, have pointed out, this lofty assessment 
is hardly without irony, as counsel for the plaintiffs was in fact a staunch opponent of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  He was likely using an overreaching state law to make an overreaching argument 
about the scope of the Amendment that would lead to rejection by the Supreme Court, and hence a 
limit upon the impact of the Amendment itself.  Michael A. Ross, Obstructing Reconstruction: John 
Archibald Campbell and the Legal Campaign Against Louisiana‟s Republican Government, 1868-
1873, 49 CIV. WAR HIST. 235, 235-53 (2003) (examining the crucial role played by John Campbell, 
ex-Confederate and counsel to the butchers in Slaughter-House, in his ultimately successful legal 
war to destroy Louisiana‘s biracial Reconstruction government) (as cited by David Bogen in this 
symposium) (David Bogen, Rebuilding the Slaughter-House: The Cases‘ Support for Civil Rights, 
42 AKRON L. REV. 1131, 1135 (2009). 
At first blush this might be taken as the affirmative use of the aphorism ―hard cases make bad law.‖ 
But as Wilson Huhn points out in his symposium article, this was instead an easy case that could 
have reached a correct result without making broad and problematic readings of the Amendment 
that then required limiting the reach of the Amendment - proving that even easy cases can make bad 
law.  Wilson R. Huhn, The Legacy of Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1053 (2009). 
 11. Even Charles Fairman hailed its primacy, considering the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Commerce Clause "the two most important passages in the entire Constitution." Charles Fairman, 
What Makes A Great Justice?, 30 B.U. L. REV. 49, 50 (1950), as cited in Aynes, Justice Miller, 
supra note 6, at 627 n.2.  A Westlaw search performed on March 26, 2009, requesting United States 
Supreme Court cases that included the terms ―Fourteenth Amendment‖ and ―Constitution‖ returned 
3833 documents. 
 12. E.g., Garrett Epps, Second Founding: The Story of the Fourteenth Amendment, 85 OR. L. 
REV. 895 (2006).  See also Symposium on America‟s Constitution: A Biography, 59 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 31, 41 (2008) (comments of Akhil Amar) (stating that because of the pro-slavery original 
Constitution, we have had ―two Constitutions,‖ the second beginning with the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments). 
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and separation of powers.
13
  It is commonplace to refer to these three as 
the great underlying themes of our constitutional order.  Yet the original 
document, as written, interpreted, and lived did not save us from – some 
may say it even led us to – the Civil War.14  As the 39th Congress 
struggled with correcting the wrongs that had placed the Union in 
jeopardy before, during, and after the Civil War, altering the 
constitutional understanding of each of these principles was important. 
In its stunning opening phrases in Section One – ―All persons born 
or naturalized . . . are citizens of the United States and of the State . . .‖  
and ―No State shall make or enforce any law . . .‖ – the Amendment 
clearly recasts state and national power and the individual‘s place within 
it.  It continues with sweeping evocations of individual rights – 
―privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . , due 
process of law . . . , the equal protection of the laws‖ – now guaranteed 
to all, and protected from state governments.  In the first Supreme Court 
 
 13. See Garrett Epps, The Antebellum Political Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, 67 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 177-78  (Summer 2004) (noting the change to national and state 
relations and individual rights, but to separation of powers with respect to the pardoning power 
specifically: ―Section 3 also changes the separation of powers created by the original Constitution, 
transferring from the President to Congress the power to grant ‗reprieves and pardons for offenses 
against the United States‘ to officials who have engaged in ‗insurrection or rebellion‘ or have given 
‗aid and comfort‘ to the nation‘s enemies.‖). 
 14. Symposium on America‟s Constitution: A Biography, supra note 12, at 39-40 (comments 
of Akhil Amar) (arguing that the 1787 Constitution failed because of the compromise with slavery: 
―[W]e didn‘t get rid of slavery because the genius of the founding fathers put it on the Lincolnian 
path of ultimate extinction.  We got rid of slavery because our Constitution failed.  It broke, and 
there's a great Civil War . . . .  That‘s why we get our egalitarian, anti-slavery, Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments Constitution.  It wasn‘t the genius of the founding fathers, 
their system broke. It was actually pro-slavery; it was getting increasingly pro-slavery as the 
decades went on.‖); id. at 51-55 (comments of Paul Finkelman) (arguing that the 1787 Constitution 
was not drafted to make slavery wither away, and hence it would not have ended naturally: in 
looking at ―the Revolution of 1865 to 1870, which rewrites the Constitution, it is important to 
understand what those framers were trying to get rid of.‖); Epps, supra note 12, at 900 (―The key to 
understanding the Fourteenth Amendment is the brute fact that for all the brilliance that went into 
the framing of the Constitution of 1787, it was a failure.  I call it a failure not simply because it 
collapsed catastrophically less than seventy-five years after the Framing, leading to the worst war in 
American history - one of the worst in world history to that time.  I call it a failure because it never 
really produced what its authors hoped for – one nation.  From its first day, it carried the seeds of its 
own destruction.  These lay in the undue influence it gave to the slave states.  The chief mechanism 
for that was the clause that gave slave states representation in the House for three-fifths of their 
slave population.  These so-called slave seats gave the South power in the electoral vote tally for the 
same reason; and in the Senate, the principle of equal representation - which Madison had opposed 
so strongly – gave them a voice equal to free states with much larger free populations.  By the third 
decade of the nineteenth century, it was generally agreed, North and South, that the slave interest 
ran the country.‖); Epps, supra note 13 (expounding upon the Slave Power that had led to Southern 
control of much of the national government and the Northern states‘ desire to break free of that 
control as important to interpreting the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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case to interpret the Amendment, the infamous Slaughter-House Cases, 
Justice Miller for the Court stated that claims made invoking Section 
One raised ―questions . . . far reaching and pervading in their 
consequences, . . . profoundly interesting to the people of this country, 
and . . . important in their bearing upon the relations of the United States, 
and of the several States to each other and to the citizens of the States 
and of the United States . . . .‖15 
Excellent historical work, some of it done in a previous symposium 
on John Bingham and the Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
published in Volume 36 of Akron Law Review, exhaustively details what 
the Framers meant to accomplish in their statement of the rights of 
individuals to citizenship, the privileges and immunities of citizenship, 
due process, and equal protection.
16
  Scholars have also painstakingly 
revealed the intended shift in power from the states to the federal 
government to define and enforce those rights.
17
 
 
 15. 83 U.S. at 67. 
 16. See, e.g., Aynes, Justice Miller, supra note 6; Aynes, John Bingham, supra note 6; 
Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to Professor 
Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45 (1980); Michael Kent Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment and 
the Bill of Rights, 14 CONN. L. REV. 237 (1982); William Crosskey, Charles Fairman, „Legislative 
History‟ and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954); but see 
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (1977); Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Michael Curtis' 
Response, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1983); Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the 
Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (1981); Charles Fairman, A Reply 
to Professor Crosskey, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 144 (1954); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth 
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).  Also, note William J. Rich 
in the symposium, urging that the meaning of  the Privileges or Immunities Clause was less about 
drastically altering federal-state relations and more about authorizing Congress to participate in 
identifying the prerequisites to equal citizenship and identifying ―privileges or immunities‖ through 
the laws of the United States.  William J. Rich, Why “Privileges and Immunities”?  An Explanation 
of the Framers‟ Intent, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1113 (2009)).  He argues the Framers were more likely to 
have been concerned about the role of Congress in defining those rights that would be enforceable 
against the states.  Id. 
 17. Aynes, Justice Miller, supra note 6; Aynes, John Bingham, supra note 6; Epps, supra note 
12; Epps, supra note 13;  Kaczorowski, supra note 9, at 916 (―The framers understood the 
fundamental rights of citizenship to be the privileges and immunities of United States citizens, and 
therefore believed Congress could proffer a change in the Constitution that would fundamentally 
redefine the nature of American federalism.‖).  Kaczorowski notes this intended restriction of state 
powers to be guaranteed by federal protection of the rights, but also notes it was not a 
nationalization that overrode a federal character to the union.  Id. at 885-90 (detailing the 
antebellum political theory of national citizenship and the rights it guaranteed, and noting that 
Taney‘s acceptance of that theory required him in Dred Scott to find that blacks could not be 
citizens; the actions taken pursuant to that decision [denying national citizenship and the protection 
of rights] led to the Republican commitment to the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights 
Acts as necessary to supplant state power with national power in order to protect national rights 
through national citizenship and congressional authority); id. at 939-40 (―Because they believed that 
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The participants in this symposium will extend that work to look at 
how early interpretations of the Amendment altered its reach and power, 
in both the Court and the polity.  Our participants especially examine 
three of the Supreme Court‘s earliest forays into applying the Fourteenth 
Amendment: Slaughter House Cases,
18
 Bradwell v. Illinois,
19
 and 
Cruikshank v. United States.
20
  Those forays succeeded in cramping the 
Amendment‘s majesty and power in contravention to its design, intent, 
and language.  Although our participants disagree about the extent to 
which the Court intended to or needed to be read as having eviscerated 
its meaning,
21
 all seem to agree that the propulsive force of the 
Amendment for legal change withered in the aftermath of those 
decisions.
22
  Several authors explore how the Amendment was 
 
the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments directly secured the civil rights of United States citizens, 
federal legislators, judges, and attorneys understood that these amendments conclusively established 
that the national government possessed both primary authority over civil rights and ultimate 
responsibility for safeguarding citizens‘ civil rights.  Despite this view, Republican legislators 
retained dual sovereignty and eschewed restructuring the United States into a unitary state. . . . 
[T]he states were expected to safeguard citizens‘ rights. But the national government was 
committed to protecting and enforcing citizens' rights as the need arose.  This concept of federalism 
was radically different from the states‟ rights-centered theory espoused by Southerners and 
conservative Democrats, and ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House 
decision. . . .  This new system was founded upon the old one.  But, in developing it, Congress 
knowingly and purposely acted to revolutionize the structure of the federal union.‖) (emphasis 
added). 
See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 82 (1873) (―[W]e do not see in those amendments any 
purpose to destroy the main features of the general system.  Under the pressure of all the excited 
feeling growing out of the war, our statesmen have still believed that the existence of the States with 
powers for domestic and local government, including the regulation of civil rights—the rights of 
person and of property—was essential to the perfect working of our complex form of government, 
though they have thought proper to impose additional limitations on the States, and to confer 
additional power on that of the Nation.‖). 
 18. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
 19. 83 U.S. 130 (1873). 
 20. 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
 21. Rich, supra note 16; Bogen, supra note 10. 
 22. After the end of Reconstruction as a political force, which occurred following the election 
of Rutherford Hayes in 1876 and the addition of Court rulings striking down key civil rights statutes 
passed by the Reconstruction Congresses, the Amendment was placed in a state approaching 
dormancy for the remainder of the nineteenth and much of the beginning of the twentieth century. 
See, e.g., Kazcorowski, supra note 9, at 938 (―The Court‘s interpretation of the fourteenth 
amendment [in Slaughter-House] revivified states' rights by reading into the Constitution the 
Democratic Conservative ideology of states' rights.  The Supreme Court thus emasculated the 
fourteenth amendment's citizenship and privileges and immunities clauses, diminished the 
amendment's scope, and destroyed the national government‘s authority to secure directly citizens' 
fundamental rights.  The Court‘s Slaughter-House decision rejected the legal theory under which 
the Department of Justice and the federal courts had acted to secure citizens‘ fundamental rights in 
the 1870s.  The Court thus precluded the national government from protecting citizens in the South 
during the 1874 revival of political terrorism, and from preventing the establishment of a pattern of 
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incorporated into the public consciousness and used by citizens to 
reimagine the fabric of American life in ways that carried forward the 
promise of the Amendment.  The symposium participants detail what 
those promises were, and how the first Court interpretations of the 
Amendment‘s reach stymied those promises on all three dimensions.23  
They also demonstrate the opportunities left open to the people
24
 and to 
later generations to use unaffected clauses to accomplish those goals.
25
 
Despite its high purpose and its structural changes to the 
constitutional framework, the Fourteenth Amendment was not 
universally embraced as a vehicle for accomplishing its guarantees.  The 
 
domination by Southern Conservative Democrats and white supremacists over Southern blacks and 
white Republicans.  The end result of this decision, as reflected in public policy, was the reduction 
of Southern blacks to peonage, the creation of Jim Crow, and the demise of the Republican Party in 
the South.‖ (footnotes omitted)); Huhn, supra note 10 (noting the effectiveness of the cases in 
limiting 14th Amendment application and even being taken as an invitation to white on black 
violence); Rebecca E. Zeitlow, Belonging, Protection and Equality: The Neglected Citizenship 
Clause and The Limits of Federalism, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 317 (2000) (―The Court‘s ruling in 
the Slaughter-House Cases is universally recognized as taking the bite out of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.‖ (citing Aynes, Justice Miller, supra note 6 at 
627.)). 
Huhn concludes that the baneful influences have been substantially overcome.  Huhn, supra note 
10.  However, recent restrictions of the Commerce Clause power, enabling states to claim immunity 
and restricting noneconomic regulations, coupled with the restriction of the Section Five power, 
limit the ability of Congress to implement the Amendment on key power issues with respect to 
enhancing constitutional liberties.  See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity precludes Congress from using the Commerce Clause in the Fair 
Labor Standards Act to authorize suits against states in state courts); United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000) (Commerce Clause does not give power to enact a federal civil rights remedy for 
victims of domestic violence despite findings of economic effects on interstate commerce); United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Congress's power to regulate intrastate matters pursuant to 
the Commerce Clause is narrowly restricted); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) 
(restricting Congress‘s Section Five power).  But see Nevada Dep‘t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 
U.S. 721, 740 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that the Family and Medical Leave Act is 
―undoubtedly valid legislation‖ and is constitutional when applied to the States).  See Laurence H. 
Tribe, Saenz sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future – Or 
Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 155 (1999) (concluding that the 
Court‘s recent view of state sovereignty leaves Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment as the 
only congressional power to trump it, and that the Court is also eroding congressional power under 
Section Five). 
 23. Huhn, supra note 10; Richard L. Aynes, The 39th Congress (1865-1867) and the 14th 
Amendment: Some Preliminary Perspectives, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1021 (2009); Gwen Hoerr Jordan, 
“Horror of a Woman”: Myra Bradwell, the 14th Amendment, and the Gendered Origins of 
Sociological Jurisprudence, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1207 (2009); Bogen, supra 10; Rich, supra note 16; 
James Fox, Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship and the Reconstruction-Era Black Public Sphere, 42 
AKRON L. REV. 1253 (2009). 
 24. Jordan, supra note 23; Fox, supra note 23; C. Ellen Connally, The Use of the 14th 
Amendment by Salmon P. Chase in the Trial of Jefferson Davis, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1169 (2009). 
 25. Rich, supra note 16; Bogen, supra note 10; Jordan, supra note 23. 
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United States Supreme Court promptly eviscerated the meaning of being 
a ―citizen of the United States,‖ especially with respect to having rights, 
privileges or immunities;
26
 rendered the privileges and immunities of a 
U.S. citizen into a nearly meaningless nullity;
27
 truncated citizenship and 
due process in ways that recreated the pre-existing state/national power 
balance;
28
 and ignored equality as a principle in ordering the 
relationships between states and their citizens.
29
  Cruikshank, which 
struck down convictions for violating the Enforcement Act of 1870, a 
congressional statute,
30
 also introduced both the narrowing of 
congressional power to enforce rights and the state action limitation.  It 
thus signaled limitations not simply upon promoting individual rights 
with federal power, but also on recognizing enhanced congressional 
prerogative to protect those rights.  In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court 
used the state action limitation to strike down significant provisions of 
Congress‘s exercises of power to protect civil rights.31  Other cases 
completed the task by severely restricting the reach of the Section Five 
power, striking down the laws passed pursuant to that power.
32
  By 1883, 
the Amendment lay in desuetude.
33
 
 
 26. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 77-79 (1873); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 138-
39 (1873). 
 27. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79. 
 28. Id. at 81 (preserving state power, while failing to limit that power to state legislation that 
furthered the purposes of the amendment, i.e., acts of the Louisiana reconstruction legislature); see 
MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND THE 
SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA 202 (2003) (―When placed within the context of 
Louisiana politics, Miller‘s majority opinion in Slaughter-House seems hardly a racist attempt to 
retreat from Reconstruction.  On the contrary, it was a vote of confidence for a biracial 
Reconstruction government then struggling to overcome the forces of reaction.‖); Cruikshank, 92 
U.S. at 555; Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875) (finding that status of citizenship does not 
include requiring states to grant women right to vote as a privilege or immunity). 
 29. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 137-139 (opinion of the Court), 141 (Bradley, J. concurring); 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554-55; Minor, 88 U.S. at 170. 
 30. The Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 140 (1870) (originally entitled ―An Act to enforce 
the rights of citizens of the United States‖). The Court‘s reasoning could also be read to cast other 
acts into question.  See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1981-1982 (2000)) (originally entitled ―An Act to protect All Persons in the United States in Their 
Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their Vindication‖); Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, §2, 
17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000)) (originally entitled ―An 
Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
and for other Purposes‖); Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, §§3-5, 18 Stat. 336, 337 (1875) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1984 (2000)) (originally entitled ―An act to protect all citizens in their civil 
and legal rights‖). 
 31. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (finding the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was an 
unconstitutional exercise of power to reach conduct other than state action). 
 32.  See Huhn, supra note 10 at 1079, text and note 131 (citing Harris v. United States, 106 
U.S. 629, 640 (1883) (declaring provision of Ku Klux Klan Act unconstitutional, as ―directed 
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The fact that we came back from that devastation is testament to the 
power of the ideals both in the Amendment and in the national 
consciousness. 
II.  SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES 
The symposium begins with general historical reviews of the 
Amendment in Congress, the public context against which it was 
enacted, its early application in the Supreme Court, and the impact of 
those narrowing decisions upon the Amendment.  It moves to an 
exploration of the doors that the early cases may have left ajar for future 
use to reinvigorate the promises of the Amendment and achieve its 
framer‘s goals.  Although the main focus of our authors is upon legal 
arguments, they also examine the force of political expediency to 
support legal arguments or to prevent their being made in ways that 
might destabilize the fragile union.  The third segment of the symposium 
looks much more directly at the impact of the actual public response to 
the Amendment and its meaning, and how that public response shaped 
the Amendment as well as keeping alive its potential to revise the fabric 
of American life and law.  Although most of the participants focus 
primarily or exclusively on Section One of the Amendment, one 
explicates the impact of Section Three and the intrigue accompanying its 
application against Jefferson Davis and another examines Section Five 
as an alteration to separation of powers as well as federalism principles. 
Professor Aynes opens the symposium by detailing the context 
within which the Framers of the 39th Congress wrote and adopted the 
language of the Amendment, and their likely understandings of its 
 
exclusively against the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the States, or their 
administration by [the] officers [of the state] . . . . ‖)); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) 
(striking down federal Civil Rights Act of 1875); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887) 
(following Harris in finding the Ku Klux Klan Act to be unconstitutional insofar as it applies to 
private action); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 14 (1906) (overturning convictions of a group 
of individuals for interfering with the civil rights of other individuals in violation of Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, in part because the statute could not be grounded upon the Fourteenth Amendment 
because ―no action on the part of the state is complained of‖). 
 33. Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the 
Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1996) (―The destruction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
and the development of an excessively broad state action doctrine had a profound impact on 
American history.  They represented a one-two punch that did much to eliminate the Fourteenth 
Amendment as an effective protector of individual rights and democracy.  Both were motivated in 
part by considerations of federalism, and in both cases the judicial solution was far broader than 
necessary.‖). 
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meaning.
34
  He emphasizes the historical record and goals in order to 
urge accurate use of the legislative debates and activity surrounding the 
Amendment and other Reconstruction statutes.  Noting the congressional 
elections of 1866 created a resounding message of public support for the 
changes the Amendment would make to constitutional society, he also 
argues the ratification of the Amendment was proper and popularly 
supported.  He ends by showing how key rights and their method of 
protection were central to achieving the overriding goal of securing the 
future peace, how equality was always meant to trump racism and 
restrictions upon and access to rights, and how in the end, the Framers 
consciously wrote in our highest and best ideals and aspirations for the 
singular purpose of ―perfecting our Constitution.‖ 
Professor Wilson Huhn reviews the early three cases in which the 
Supreme Court expounded upon the reach and meaning of the 
Amendment, in all three cases restricting its scope unnecessarily.
35
  He 
demonstrates how those readings were both contrary to the intent of the 
Framers and led to truncated legal understandings of the Amendment, 
limiting Congress‘s ability to use it against state power outside the 
narrow area of direct state conduct restricting racial equality.  He also 
shows how those decisions stripped African-Americans of legal 
protections in the eyes of white mobs, who acted as if empowered by the 
decisions, further contradicting the primary impact the Amendment 
sought to achieve.  Huhn argues that the enduring legacy from 
Slaughter-House, Bradwell, and Cruikshank was the acceptance of the 
theme from each: narrowly construing the fundamental liberty rights of 
citizens, defining equality by reference to unequal traditions and 
religious teachings, and prohibiting Congress from protecting the civil 
rights of blacks and others especially when the state proved unable or 
unwilling to do so.  He demonstrates the recurrence of those themes in 
20th and 21st century rights-constricting decisions.  But he also notes 
how those decisions were either circumvented or rejected to lead to a 
current environment in which he argues the ―baneful influences‖ of 
those restrictions have been practically overcome. 
My contribution examines the historical purposes and political 
meanings of Section Five in the view of the Framers.
36
 The article notes 
the importance of incorporating political and legal theory at the time of 
 
 34. Aynes, supra note 23. 
 35. Huhn, supra note 10. 
 36. Elizabeth Reilly, The Union as it Wasn‟t and the Constitution as it Isn‟t: Section Five and 
Altering the Balance of Powers, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1083 (2009). 
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the original framing and at the time of the framing of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a method for understanding how it alters separation of 
powers with respect to the rights protected by the Amendment.  Section 
Five is a mechanism for incorporating historical purpose and public 
construction of the guarantees of the Amendment into later statutes. 
In the second portion of the symposium, the authors reject the 
traditional and canonical readings of the early cases, especially 
Slaughter-House, urging that the history of that opinion reflects a more 
nuanced attempt by Justice Miller to preserve the goals of 
Reconstruction and racial equality by hinting at alternative methods to 
achieve the fundamental rights goals of the Amendment.
37
  They look 
beyond the acknowledged actual effects of the cases in foreclosing the 
use of certain guarantees or national powers to explore the doors left 
open for achieving the intended goals of the Amendment. 
Professor William Rich writes that Justice Miller‘s position in 
Slaughter-House on the meaning of federal privileges and immunities 
has been misunderstood and underappreciated.  Although denying their 
usefulness for enforcing many rights and interests, Justice Miller did not 
foreclose a significant avenue for using the clause for good.
38
  Professor 
Rich argues that we have been lulled into a continuing failure to under-
appreciate the positive meaning of federal privileges and immunities 
post-Slaughter-House.  He contends that the academic focus on reading 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the vehicle for applying the Bill 
of Right to the States, which is no longer necessary because of the 
impact of the selective incorporation doctrine read into the Due Process 
Clause, has distracted us from recognizing that privileges and 
immunities were meant to include rights drawn from federal legislation 
generally.  It thus means more than the Bill of Rights and should reach 
state compliance with federal law broadly. 
To highlight the possibilities left open in Justice Miller‘s opinion, 
Professor David Bogen urges a reading sensitive to its complicated 
context.
39
  Drawing from Professor Michael Ross‘s historical work, he 
notes that Miller was trying to avoid undercutting state Reconstruction 
legislatures by preserving state prerogatives from becoming generally 
nationalized.  Because the butchers‘ lawyer was John Campbell, a 
former Justice in the majority in Dred Scott, a member of the 
Confederate government and a fierce opponent of Reconstruction and 
 
 37. Rich, supra note 16; Bogen, supra note 10. 
 38. Rich, supra note 16. 
 39. Bogen, supra note 10. 
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the Amendment, Miller was concerned that a ruling for the plaintiffs 
would have played into the hands of opponents of the guarantees – 
especially of racial equality – in the Amendment.  Whereas Professor 
Huhn argues that an appropriate standard of deference to legislative 
action (be it state or federal) would have preserved the Amendment‘s 
promise more surely and faithfully, Professor Bogen contends that the 
broad protection of state legislation and reassertion of state power 
empowered Reconstruction legislatures.  He urges a return to the vision 
he attributes to Justice Miller: the use of federal power to protect federal 
and state political processes.  He also claims that the consequent lack of 
a vital Privileges or Immunities Clause led to more breadth being read 
into the Equal Protection Clause.  But Professor Bogen is most 
interested in demonstrating what he finds as either explicit preservations 
of avenues to achieve the goals of the Amendment crafted into Justice 
Miller‘s opinion, or suggesting unthought-of avenues that remained 
available to counteract the chafing limits of Slaughter-House‘s reading 
of privileges and immunities. 
Whereas Professors Rich and Bogen reinterpret Slaughter-House to 
focus on the doors left open for achieving the goals of the Amendment, 
historian Ellen Connally‘s contribution forms a bridge between this 
section of the symposium and the next.
40
  Her work shows how the 
language of Section Three left a door open to interpretation that enabled 
extra-legal political and social decisions that may have been critical to 
securing a lasting peace and reintegration of the Union.  She explains the 
importance of the question of whether Section Three was a disability or 
a penalty, because the penalty interpretation created an argument that 
double jeopardy prevented trying Confederate officers for treason.  She 
details the tremendous stakes of prosecuting Jefferson Davis for treason.  
Such a prosecution was potentially devastating whatever its outcome.  
An acquittal would have amounted to an acceptance of his legal 
argument that secession was constitutionally permitted, jeopardizing the 
Union position against secession and the meaning of the horrendous 
bloodshed in pursuit of that position.  Yet, if he were convicted and hung 
– in contravention to Lincoln‘s firm stance on the issue – he could have 
been a southern martyr, interfering with the ability of the Union to meld 
together as one healing nation.  Her work bridges this section into the 
third because it relies on contemporary legal interpretation with a court 
in mind, but demonstrates the sociological pragmatism of the main 
 
 40. Connally, supra note 24. 
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actors – especially Salmon P. Chase – to achieve the wider goals of the 
framers of the Amendment in securing lasting peace. 
The third section of the symposium looks behind and beyond 
Congress and the Supreme Court to explore the vital importance of how 
American citizens themselves interpreted and advanced the rights 
secured in the Amendment. 
Gwen Jordan examines the underlying story of the Bradwell case to 
reveal how women interpreted the grant of equal rights and citizenship.
41
  
She shows that Myra Bradwell always understood her case as raising 
issues under the Equal Protection Clause, and used that clause in her 
arguments to the Illinois Supreme Court.  Bradwell understood her case 
to be about securing legal equality through affirmative rights claims that 
would achieve full citizenship for women through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  She argued the Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause 
applied to women, a conclusion not reached by the Supreme Court until 
a century later.  Ironically, her arguments were not made by her own 
attorney, the representative of the City of New Orleans in Slaughter-
House Cases, who instead adopted his opponent‘s argument in that case 
with respect to privileges and immunities.  Professor Jordan shows how 
Bradwell‘s position eventually prevailed, but more importantly how 
Bradwell and other feminists used this belief about the scope of the 
citizenship rights the Amendment secured to animate the broader social 
movement for women‘s suffrage as well as wider equality.  In this way, 
women were active participants in defining the meaning of equality in 
citizenship that is enshrined in the Amendment.  Professor Jordan argues 
that this use of the law and legal reasoning is the forerunner of 
sociological jurisprudence, which recognizes the power of law as an 
instrumental force for social change. 
James Fox continues exploring the impact of the public, 
particularly African-Americans, in infusing real meaning into the 
guarantees and lofty language of Section One.  He focuses on the often-
overlooked Citizenship Clause that ringingly introduces the entire 
Amendment.
42
  Professor Fox examines the meaning of citizenship as 
seen through the eyes and actions of black Americans during the Civil 
War and Reconstruction.  He details the number of civic societies 
formed by blacks to make them active participants in civil society and 
the public sphere.  Through those groups, African-Americans both 
demonstrated and helped to define what citizenship meant to them, while 
 
 41. Jordan, supra note 23. 
 42. Fox, supra note 23. 
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engaging in activities essential to democratic citizenship.  Importantly, 
they also used their understandings of the rights of citizenship to argue 
for the critical necessity of voting rights as a foundation to secure civil 
liberties and access to social citizenship.  Their understandings 
transformed the wider public‘s grasp on what citizenship entailed as 
well.  By forming their own public sphere in which to work out issues of 
citizenship important to them, African-Americans both imagined and 
helped create an idea of citizenship that was more expansive and 
ultimately richer than that envisioned without their input.  Professor Fox 
argues that African-Americans created a concept of citizenship that 
radically joined traditional ideas of legal rights with emerging ideas of 
suffrage rights, and put forth a newly formed and still underdeveloped 
idea of the necessity of positive rights to access to spheres of civil 
society in order to achieve true equal citizenship for all. 
The rich and diverse views expressed in this symposium far from 
exhaust an understanding of the importance and history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  But they do provide for us some new windows 
into what the Amendment was designed to accomplish, how those 
purposes were acted upon by Congress before being unduly narrowed 
and denied in the Supreme Court, how those purposes survived with 
potential legal arguments to undo the damage from the Court‘s 
interpretations, and how those purposes were kept alive by the people 
who embraced them as realities, as well as promises. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
As it took from 1776 until 1868 for the ―self-evident‖ ―truth‖43 of 
equality to be enshrined in our Constitution, the early cases in which the 
United States Supreme Court dealt with the Fourteenth Amendment 
created a similar lapse of time into the twentieth century before its 
guarantees began to be recognized and enforced meaningfully – many 
date it to 1954 and Brown v. Board of Education.
44
  And, as with the 
abolitionists in the antebellum period, the understandings and actions of 
the people with respect to the reach of its guarantees profoundly 
influenced its legal as well as cultural meaning. 
 
 43. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (―We hold these truths to be self 
evident: that all men are created equal . . . .‖). 
 44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Brown@50, www.brownat50.org (last visited Mar. 30, 
2009) (―For all men of good will May 17, 1954, came as a joyous daybreak to end the long night of 
enforced segregation . . . . It served to transform the fatigue of despair into the buoyancy of hope.‖) 
(excerpt from a 1960 address to the National Urban League in response to the decision in Brown v. 
Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) by Martin Luther King, Jr.). 
06-REILLY_INTRO 10/27/2009  4:04 PM 
1018 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:1003 
The development and meaning of the Amendment, even for 
contemporary and future use, is intimately related to the past.  We 
cannot avoid continuing to ask vital questions and seek answers to them.  
What the Amendment meant in the past and how it has been interpreted 
and applied throughout its 140 years of existence have resonance today.  
Whatever one‘s interpretive stance toward the Constitution, one 
important facet of interpretation is looking to original intent, original 
meaning, and public understanding of a constitutional provision. 
Therefore, our participants explicitly discuss applying their 
understanding of history to the modern implications of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and current law.  Understanding the Amendment, especially 
because of its early reception by the Court, requires looking at law, 
history, political science, and sociology, among other disciplines, to try 
to get a full view.  Through this variety of prisms, we can look at what 
the framers and ratifiers were trying to accomplish, compare and 
contrast them with each other and with the response of the Supreme 
Court, and seek to provide insights for judges, lawyers, academics, and 
students. 
We hope that this symposium places the development of the 
Fourteenth Amendment into context by bringing law, history, sociology, 
and political science to bear to examine its drafting, early treatment, and 
meaning to the Court and society.  Those early days still influence what 
the Amendment can and cannot accomplish.  Our goal is to explore how 
a grounded and historically informed understanding of the Amendment 
might assist us in addressing the problems to which we apply it today. 
An Anniversary is always an occasion to celebrate, but also to 
assess.  By looking backward, we today attempt to find positive ways for 
moving forward to achieve the great aspirations bequeathed to us by 
those who framed and ratified our Fourteenth Amendment. 
